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Abstract: In this article I defend the capability approach by focusing on its built-in gender-
sensitivity and on its concern with comprehensive outcomes and informationally-rich 
evaluation of well-being, two elements of Sen’s work that are too rarely put together. I then 
try to show what the capability approach would have to gain by focusing on trans-positional 
objectivity (as Elizabeth Anderson does) and by leaving behind the narrow confines of states in 
favor of a more cosmopolitan stance. These preliminary discussions are followed by two more 
precise applications. At first, I show how a gender-sensitive capability approach that respects 
the criteria of trans-positional objectivity and cosmopolitanism can enhance the agency of 
women inhabiting third-world societies. I turn next to show how mainstream feminism can 
insulate itself against criticisms such as bell hooks’ by switching to trans-positional objectivity 
in public reasoning. 
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The capability approach was proposed as a way to account for the ubiquitous 
element of human diversity (Robeyns 2000, 6-7). Sen’s background in social choice led 
to the development of an approach to justice that sacrifices simplicity for the sake of 
providing more adequate answers to the problems human beings encounter. In order 
to accomplish that objective, the capability approach is concerned not merely with 
the outcomes of applying distributive principles, but with what Sen calls comprehensive 
outcomes, which assess consequences as well as “social process, including the exercise of 
duties and responsibilities” (Sen 2010, 22). Furthermore, the capability approach has a 
built-in gender sensitivity that lacks from many other accounts of justice. 
The capability approach thus has various elements that make it attractive for 
feminist theorizing.1 By focusing on real freedom and on comprehensive outcomes, it 
can identify and provide adequate answers to problems that have a negative impact on 
the well-being of women, such as adaptive preferences (Teschl and Comim 2005). The 
main claim of the paper is that feminist studies would have much to gain by focusing on 
another, less discussed aspect of Sen’s work, the concept of trans-positional objectivity 
(Sen 1982; 1992; 1993; 2010, 155-74). Furthermore, unlike current extensions of Sen’s 
work on positional objectivity to feminist deliberative democracy (Anderson 2003), I 
argue that we must renounce at the arbitrary confinement of the scope of justice to states 
and instead advocate a global scope. Albeit Sen endorses open impartiality and public 
1] I have in mind here Western feminist theories, committed to the idea that women are oppressed 
in various ways in patriarchal societies and that this should cease to be the case. I do not refer particularly 
to one or another feminist theory. 
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reasoning at a global scale, certain feminist applications of the capability approach have 
the aforementioned shortcoming.2
In order to accomplish this objective I proceed as follows. In the first section 
I introduce the various lines of Sen’s arguments, focusing on his criticism of 
informationally-parsimonious theories of justice and on his defense of capabilities as the 
proper metric of distributive justice. In the second section I present Sen’s case for trans-
positional objectivity and his criticism of Rawls’ “closed impartiality” (Sen 2010, 128). 
In the third section I argue that focusing on a narrow scope of justice, the state, flaws 
Anderson’s application of Sen’s work on positional objectivity. The fourth section shows 
what mainstream feminism would have to gain by incorporating the aforementioned 
considerations. At first, I show how a gender-sensitive capability approach that respects 
the criteria of trans-positional objectivity and cosmopolitanism can enhance the agency 
of women inhabiting third-world societies. I turn next to show how mainstream feminism 
can insulate itself against criticisms such as bell hooks’ by switching to trans-positional 
objectivity in public reasoning (hooks 1999). Section V concludes.
I. ESCA PI NG I N FOR M ATIONA L PA R SI MON Y – A J USTIFICATION FOR TH E CA PA BILITI ES 
A PPROACH 
One of Amartya Sen’s far-reaching contributions has been the emphasis on 
informational constraints in social choice theory, political philosophy or ethics. Although 
the focus of this paper is on the latter two, Sen’s work on social choice theory plays an 
important role in understanding some of his criticisms regarding utilitarianism. In 
his main contribution to the field of social choice, Sen showed how the anonymity 
and neutrality conditions left out important information regarding relations between 
individuals or the intensity of agents’ preferences3 (Sen 1970, 198-99). In the field of justice, 
Sen similarly showed how moral principles exclude certain categories of information and 
that usability of information is highly dependent on what principles are chosen (1985, 
169-184; 1993, 73-88). For instance, utilitarianism proposes a flawed evaluation of well-
being, since it comprises three distinct elements that combined reduce its informational 
scope, i.e. consequentialism, welfarism and sum-ranking (Sen 1985, 175). Sen argues 
that utilitarianism is informationally parsimonious and that it lacks the means to judge 
adequately the goodness of states of affairs. The main problem is with the welfarist 
component, which deliberately ignores all information that is not based on utility when 
evaluating end states, which reverberates on its muteness pertaining to evaluating actions: 
“had welfarism not been additionally imposed, consequentialism could have coexisted 
2] I refer here mainly to Anderson, as she is the most prominent theoretician who has linked feminist 
problems with Sen’s work on positional objectivity. 
3] For an account of the lessons that can be learned by feminists from social choice and vice versa 
see Peter (2003).
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with taking note of such things as the values and disvalues of actions through the valuation 
of states, which include these actions” (Sen 1985, 182)4.
What motivates Sen’s (and Nussbaum’s) capability approach is human diversity, 
which is purportedly not satisfactorily taken into account by other approaches. The 
human diversity aspect is strongly related to the evaluation of states of affairs. Capabilities 
have been proposed as replacements to other metrics of justice – what Sen calls evaluative 
space (1992, 20) and Cohen “currency of justice” (1989) – because those are severely 
limited by informational constraints. For instance, Rawls’ primary goods approach5 is 
inadequate because it would give nothing to a cripple who has access to primary goods.6 
Rawls’ contractarian theory of justice is based on the premise that rational and reasonable 
parties placed behind a veil of ignorance will choose the principles of justice as fairness7 
(which stand in a lexicographical order) – the principle of an equal right to sets of equal 
basic liberties and the second principle, comprising the fair equality of opportunity and 
the difference principle (2001, 302). Rawls justifies the device of the veil of ignorance 
by holding that any personal contingencies have to be removed in order to reach a truly 
fair agreement (2001, 15)8. What he proposes is a political conception of justice for a 
democratic society, conceiving citizens as free and equal (Rawls 1999, 31) and taking part 
in the affairs of a “mutually advantageous cooperative venture” (1971, 112).
4] Elsewhere, Sen criticizes utilitarianism, for its leading to counterintuitive implications. For in-
stance, utilitarians would distribute more to a pleasure wizard than to a cripple, because the pleasure wiz-
ard’s marginal utility is higher than the cripple’s: “the cripple would then be doubly worse off […] both since 
he gets less utility from the same level of income, and since he will also get less income” (1979, 203).
5] Rawls considers that the index of well-being should comprise primary goods, which are “all-
purpose goods” that individuals with diverse conceptions of the good would want in the original position, 
because “other things equal, they prefer a wider to a narrower liberty and opportunity, and a greater rather 
than a smaller share of wealth and income (1971, 396).
6] Another variant of resourcism, Dworkin’s equality of resources, would uphold distributions to 
those who lack physical endowments – what he calls “personal resources”: “Someone who is born with 
a serious handicap faces his life with what we concede to be fewer resources [...]. This circumstance justi-
fies compensation” (through his favored hypothetical insurance market) (Dworkin 2002, 81). However, 
Dworkin’s view faces other problems. For some of the most relevant criticisms, see Burley (2004).
7] Rawls writes that “[…] the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain” (1971, 
12). The idea of agreement has been interpreted differently. One operationalization of the agreement in the 
original position does not require ontologically distinct parties. Alexander (1974) argued that Rawls’ is not 
a contract theory, because it could be replaced by an individual choice theory or a sympathetic observer 
theory at no loss for its substantial claims. Jean Hampton (1980, 337) holds that because behind the veil 
of ignorance parties are indistinguishable it is better to interpret the deliberation as being the result of the 
reasoning of a single party.
8] Earlier (Rawls 1971, 12), he mentioned that parties do not know “their place in society, their class 
position, social status, intelligence, fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their concep-
tions of the good or their special psychological propensities”. In his later work he includes comprehensive 
doctrines since “not allowing the parties to know people’s comprehensive doctrines is one way in which the 
veil of ignorance is thick as opposed to thin” (Rawls 1999, 31).
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The definition advanced by Rawls of society as a “mutually advantageous cooperative 
venture” has attracted the criticism of feminists such as Young (2006) for ignoring those 
who are not able-bodied and thus are not contributing parts of the society. One related 
criticism is that Rawls fails to include in his index care and dependency related primary 
goods, such as “the understanding that we will be cared for if we become dependent, the 
support we require if we have to take on the work of caring for a dependent, the assurance 
that if we become dependent, someone will take on the job of caring for those who are 
dependent upon us” (Kittay 1999, 102)9. Similarly, Nussbaum holds that caregivers are 
disregarded by Rawls’ theory of justice, a deficiency that her capability approach tries to 
solve. These considerations are integrated in her own version of the capability approach, 
which acknowledges that securing capabilities entails a process of designing the material 
and institutional framework “so that it provides the requisite affirmative support for all 
the relevant capabilities” (Nussbaum 2003, 51-55). Capabilities are combinations of 
functionings, which in turn are doings and beings that a person can achieve if she desires 
(Sen 1992, 40). While capabilities represent the opportunity/freedom aspect, functionings 
concern the outcome/achievement aspect (Robeyns 2003, 63). In order to differentiate 
between these two aspects, the capability approach needed to escape the narrow confines 
of informationally-parsimonious accounts of justice such as utilitarianism. Thus, it could 
be argued that informational richness and the case for assessing comprehensive outcomes 
are the main sources of the capabilities approach.
The capability approach is not a full theory of justice and by itself it proposes just 
an evaluative space – the metric of capabilities. According to Robeyns, the capability 
approach operates at three levels, being capable of taking various forms according to 
one’s needs. It can be a framework of thought, a critique of other approaches to well-being 
assessment and a formula for making interpersonal comparisons of well-being (Robeyns 
2000, 3). The fact that the capability approach is “underspecified” can be double-edged: 
the sensitivity of the approach to gender is dependent on what additional theories are 
brought to complement it. Robeyns develops a gender-sensitive capability approach, 
which shows what feminism has to gain from resorting to this conceptual apparatus. She 
emphasizes 3 elements of the capability approach that make it a good candidate for being 
complemented by feminist theories, i.e. i) its evaluative space, ii) the attention given to 
human diversity and iii) its employment of ethical individualism. The second of these is of 
paramount importance for feminism because it can be seen as a way to internalize Okin’s 
(1989) criticism of theories of justice for their failure to acknowledge the way in which the 
different experiences of females and women affect their subsequent development.
i) One of the reasons why Sen endorses the capability metric and not a functioning 
metric is because of what he calls an “informationally inclusive advantage” of the former, 
since focusing on capabilities allows one to account for the opportunities and choices of 
the agent, who is not perceived as a simple recipient, but whose interests and engagement 
9] For a defense of Rawls, see Wong (2010, 127-146).
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are taken into account in a proper way (2010, 236). This is not without criticism – Cohen 
argues that behind the capability approach is a certain “athleticism”, which consists of 
“overestimating the place of freedom and activity in well-being” (1990, 377)10. Sen argues 
that in assessing well-being freedom, one should look at the capability levels, but concedes 
that “limits of practicality may force the analysis to be confined to examining the achieved 
functioning bundle only” (1992, 53). This is nonetheless not desirable from a normative 
standpoint, and capabilities should be the evaluative space. Of course, going further, 
well-being is not the only aspect that people should be enabled to reach – agency plays 
an important role too, as I will show later on. For feminists, the capability metric is more 
appropriate than a resourcist or a welfarist one because it focuses on people’s doings and 
beings and thus has something to say on the inequalities within the family. According 
to Nussbaum (2003, 39) “inequalities in resources and opportunities, educational 
deprivations, the failure of work to be recognized as work, insults to bodily integrity” 
are all hindrances that diminish the capability sets of women and thus should be solved. 
The fact that the capability approach is so sensitive to structural injustices affecting the 
conversion of bundles of goods into functionings is held to be a powerful argument in 
favor of this evaluative space (Anderson 2010a, 87).
ii) Robeyns (2000, 6) holds that the capability approach takes account of human 
diversity in two distinct ways: by focusing on capabilities as the evaluative space (assessing 
thus the opportunities held by people and not imposing outcome desirability) and by 
looking at individual and social factors of converting commodities into functionings.11 
Among the social factors affecting the conversion of commodities into functionings is 
gender discrimination. Furthermore, by looking not only at market processes, but also 
at what happens in the private households, the capability approach internalizes another 
criticism raised by feminists against other theories of justice (Robeyns 2008, 89-90). 
Capabilitarians hold that personal heterogeneities cannot be accounted for by other 
evaluative spaces, which cannot deal with feminine experiences such as breast-feeding. 
However, there have been arguments that gender-sensitive versions of resourcism could 
be developed, which would take into account the needs of the infants. This is closely related 
to a criticism addressed to the capability approach that it proposes a vertical conception 
of the human nature – “that it falsely suggests that women’s terrible and disproportionate 
suffering in most of this world is due to their being insufficiently compensated for their 
inferior natural endowments” (Pogge 2002, 181-83). One capabilitarian response has 
been that this criticism is based on the idea that capability theorists try to compensate 
people for bad luck in the natural allocation of internal resources (Anderson 2010a, 
10] Arneson (2006, 37) also expresses concern towards the focus on what he calls real option free-
dom – “in many contexts, adding extra valuable options and thus increasing a person’s real option freedom 
would come at a cost or lesser achieved well-being, and in these contexts we should favor achieving more 
functioning. Beyond some point, expansion of real option freedom is wasteful of resources that are better 
spent targeted at boosting functionings”. 
11] Commodities here represent the resources distributed, i.e. income or rights. 
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95). While this is a powerful argument, it is based on Anderson’s democratic egalitarian 
proposal, which constrains, as I will show, the scope of justice in an illegitimate way. 
iii) Robeyns argues that the capability approach is based only on ethical 
individualism, which postulates that the fundamental unit of human concern is the 
individual. This does not imply ontological individualism, on which it has nothing to 
say. It can be complemented by various theories regarding ontology. This is important 
for those feminists who emphasize the necessity of accounting in a theory of justice 
for the relations between people or between people and nature (Robeyns 2000, 19). 
Nussbaum’s (2000, 79) list of central human capabilities includes the capability of 
being able to have a connection with the nature, which should make this view attractive 
to eco-feminism, for instance.
Having established how the capability approach is responsive to gender, I turn 
now to the main concern of this paper, the problem of positional objectivity and its 
impact on feminist agendas. In the next section I will briefly present Sen’s arguments 
for open impartiality, his account of positional objectivity and his endorsement of trans-
positional objectivity. In order to understand what open impartiality is and why Sen 
criticizes Rawls’ contractarianism, it is necessary to explain the relation between justice 
as fairness and global justice. 
II. SK E W ED I M PA RTI A LIT Y, POSITIONA L OBJECTI V IT Y A N D TH E BI A SES BEHI N D 
PU BLIC R E A SON 
Although Rawls (1971) leaves an element of ambiguity regarding the scope of 
justice12, in later works it becomes clear that justice as fairness is meant to be a political 
conception of justice for well-ordered peoples. Rawls holds that principles of global justice 
are to be established following a second original position, where the parties are now 
representatives of peoples. The veil of ignorance device is once again implemented and 
this time it excludes from knowledge facts such as the size of territory or of the population, 
the relative strength of the peoples whom the parties represent, the natural resource 
endowments, the level of economic development (Rawls 1999, 31-32). The peoples and 
their representatives are moved by reasonable interests, which is congruent with a fair 
equality and a due respect for all peoples. The idea of public reason is generalized, since 
the parties do not invoke principles related to their comprehensive doctrines of truth or 
right, but in terms that can represent a common ground to all the different peoples taking 
part in the deliberation. More controversial, Rawls includes decent hierarchical societies 
along the liberal ones. These are not reasonable, but decent (this is a weaker criterion than 
reasonability) (Rawls 1999, 83-84). Decent hierarchical societies have a process of public 
consultation and minorities are encouraged to have a flourishing life, but are not allowed 
12] The scope of justice refers to “the range of persons who have claims upon and responsibilities to 
each other arising from considerations of justice” (Abizadeh 2007, 323).
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to hold offices (in contradistinction with the fair equality of opportunity part of Rawls’ 
second principle of justice as fairness) (Rawls 1999, 77-78). This aspect is important for 
the subject discussed here because Rawls employs a “narrow doctrine of human rights” 
(Macleod 2006, 134-49). In one of his examples, a decent hierarchical society can be one 
in which women are relegated to a status of second-order citizens, if important reforms 
have been undertaken in regard to their rights.
Furthermore, Rawls does not uphold a global difference principle, but a weaker 
duty of “assistance to burdened society” (1999, 37). The fact that Rawls includes decent 
hierarchical societies and scales down the principles of justice and the requirements of 
justice in order to appeal to these has been criticized as an inadequate concession. Kok 
Chor Tan (2004, 75) argues that “the normative individualism fundamental to Rawls’ 
domestic theory is replaced by a communitarianism of a sort that takes societies or 
peoples to be the basic subject of justice”. Tolerating and accepting as justified (although 
not as fair) decent hierarchical societies leads to ignoring dissenting individuals from 
those nonliberal societies (Tan 2006, 75). 
 Now we can begin to understand Sen’s arguments against Rawls’ closed impartiality. 
According to Sen (2010, 182), limiting the original position to peoples inhabiting a 
society “extracts a heavy price in the absence of any procedural guarantee that local values 
will be subjected to an open scrutiny”. Sen (2010, 125) advocates Adam Smith’s impartial 
spectator device, which allows one to examine values, convictions and principles “at 
a distance”. Rawls, unlike Smith, limits the deliberation to a “given focal group” which 
might reflect pre-contractarian biases (Sen 2010, 133). In this light, there are several 
limitations of the original position device, such as “exclusionary neglect” (people who do 
not belong in that society are excluded, although they might be affected by the outcomes 
of the deliberation) or “procedural parochialism” (other worldviews are excluded from 
considerations, and even the veil of ignorance cannot prevent the decisions from “being 
swayed only by local group prejudices”) (Sen 2010, 139, 150). These are some reasons 
why closed impartiality is morally flawed and why Sen endorses open impartiality. It 
is important to note here that Sen’s endorsement of open impartiality is partially (and 
implicitly) based on his work on informational constraints.
Sen (1985, 184) engages in a discussion on objectivity insisting on cases that are 
position-relative but authorship-invariant. For instance, irrespective of the identity of a 
poor-sighted professor, she would not know that the student in the last row is cheating. If 
that student had been in the professor’s position, having the same characteristics (poor 
sightedness), she would hold the same belief. This is what he later calls objective positionality 
(1992), a concept with implications for decision theory, gender discrimination, morbidity 
rates assessment and ethics. It is to be distinguished from subjectivity, since it does not 
depend on psychological processes peculiar to a person or another – anyone being 
in the same circumstances and being endowed with the same quantity of information 
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would hold the same view. Later, Sen insists on the relevance of this sense of objectivity, 
proceeding with a criticism of Nagel’s “view from nowhere” – type of objectivity.13
Against Nagel, he argues that this view is not “from nowhere, but from a delineated 
somewhere” (Sen 1993, 127). This concept is important because it shows how beliefs 
can be objective, irrespective of their truth value.14 What values one has, what position in 
society she occupies, what knowledge she holds, all these elements influence her objective 
assessment of the world – Sen calls these features positional parameters. In order to avoid 
the inevitable biases associated with this positional relativity, Sen recommends trans-
positional assessments, the aggregation of different positional observations into a whole. 
Trans-positional assessments transcend the biases of positional parameters by making 
more information accessible to others and by allowing the public agenda to be influenced 
by opinions who hitherto have been ignored in an objective way (Sen 1992, 6). Pursuing 
trans-positional objectivity has important implications for feminism. Sen shows that 
living in a society where women are considered second-order citizens and accordingly 
paid less than men might contribute to one’s holding an objective positional belief that 
women value less than men. It is an objective assessment because anyone living in that 
society, having access to the same sources of information, would hold the same opinion. 
However, the need for trans-positionality is relevant because this is the only way in which 
dissenting views could be taken into account. Trans-positionality allows criticism to be 
internal and not a form of cultural imperialism (Sen 1992, 6). Women who had access 
to more sources of information than their male and female counterparts would then be 
allowed to expose others to these new sources and maybe to alleviate through public 
deliberation the condition of women. Sen argues that a similar procedure is proposed 
by Adam Smith, and that the impartial spectator is introduced as a way to obtain such a 
trans-positional view (Sen 1992, 5-6).
The connections between positional objectivity and the capability approach are 
easy to understand, especially when one sees through this filter the criticisms raised 
against desire satisfaction or happiness-based assessments of the quality of life. Sen gives 
the example of self-reported morbidity rates among Indian women. According to Sen, 
this reflects not only their lack of education, but also of accepting this state of affairs. Sen 
(1992, 14) admits that:
by constraining the positional parameters very thoroughly, it would be possible to 
attribute positional objectivity to the Indian rural women’s lack of sense of relative 
deprivation in health or well-being...on the other hand, this positional objectivity, 
achieving through extensive constraining, would not readily translate into trans-
positional objectivity of women’s relative deprivation. 
13] In which Nagel argues that “the standpoint of political theory is necessarily detached and ob-
jective” (1986, 188).
14] “Truth is quite a different issue from the objectivity of the reasoning leading to a particular belief, 
given the access to information that the person has” (Sen 1993, 127).
Adelin Costin Dumitru 89
Would it be paternalistic or imperialistic to criticize this state of affairs and promote 
women participation in public debates? Martha Nussbaum (2000) offers many examples 
of how educated women set out to reform their communities, examples which contradict 
the thesis that this is how the Indian culture is and any attempt to change the state of 
affairs would be intrusive. Positional objectivity can and should be transcended in order 
to leave behind such cultural biases, nonetheless. I end this section by quoting at length 
Sen’s own view on the necessity of trans-positional objectivity, which provides a direct 
link to the next section as well:
“[…] in denying the objectivity of the belief in women’s inferiority one can of course 
invoke the need for a trans-positional assessment involving international perspectives, 
drawing on observations and beliefs from vantage points prevailing in other societies 
where women have more opportunity to show their ability. But the more immediate 
issue is the non-necessity of taking an establishment view of feminine inferiority even 
for those living in such a society. Contrary views can be taken consistently with living 
in such a society, and the critique of that view can be internal” (1993, 139).
III. W HOSE DEMOCR ATIC EQUA LIT Y? NA R ROW SCOPE, NA R ROW ER CA PA BILIT Y SETS 
In this section I try to accomplish three things: 1. to show how Sen’s concept of 
positional objectivity has been applied to deliberative democracy by Elizabeth Anderson; 
2. to refute Anderson’s capability-based democratic equality on cosmopolitan grounds 
and 3. to argue for a gender-sensitive and cosmopolitan relational egalitarianism. This 
section is meant to defend an approach to justice inspired by Sen’s conceptualization 
of informational constraints, positional objectivity and capabilities, with further inputs 
from global justice theories and democratic equality philosophers. I will briefly present 
the central line of argumentation in the next section, so that the uninterested reader can 
skip this section. 
Anderson interprets Sen’s positional objectivity as a conceptual apparatus that 
could reduce the tension between woman perspectives and moral objectivity (2003, 
239). She argues that we could place evaluative perspectives on a continuum ranging from 
local to global. Those who employ the global perspective hold that local perspectives are 
biased, sectarian and inadequate. This is the view adopted, inter alia, by Nagel or Rawls. 
The other end of the continuum is occupied, among others, by feminists, and it advocates 
perspective pluralism. Each different perspective, being forged in different circumstances, 
is unique and brings something new to the debate. For good reason, Anderson quotes 
among those holding this position Sandra Harding (1993, 49-82). Harding proposes a 
standpoint feminist epistemology that bears resemblance to Sen’s justification for open 
impartiality and trans-positional objectivity. According to Harding, the experiences of 
those at the bottom of society, disadvantaged on racial, ethnical or gender criteria, should 
be brought on research agenda. The fact that their experiences, opinions and values have 
been ignored means that what happens in the public sphere lacks comprehensiveness. 
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As it accounts for the fact that “one’s social situation enables and sets limits on what one 
can know”, her proposed standpoint feminist epistemology is based on the premise that 
basing research on women’s lives will generate “less partial and distorted accounts not 
only of women’s lives but also of men’s lives and of the whole social order” (Harding 1993, 
55-6). Similarly, to Anderson, she contests the view that the only alternatives to “the 
view from nowhere” are ethnocentrism and relativism (1993, 58). It is interesting to see 
how a version of epistemology feminism has been developed in parallel to Sen’s work on 
positional objectivity leading basically to the same conclusions.
Anderson (2003, 242-43) shows, however, that obtaining a trans-positional account 
can be done on distinct grounds, some with more appealing implications than others. 
She offers four main such reasons: ascriptive identification (on the basis of gender, 
ethnicity, race), sympathy, practical identification and respect. Ascriptive identities refer 
to relations established by birth (kinship, ethnicity, race, caste) or through religious or 
cultural affiliation and are hopelessly parochial and sectarian, creating conflict between 
different viewpoints and unable to generate a fully universal evaluative position. For 
Anderson, attempting to obtain an inclusive trans-positionality is meant to solve some 
informational constraints of democratic rules. Sen has argued for the inclusion of 
“procedural considerations in consequential analysis” (1995, 13) – although they may 
seem efficient, some outcomes cannot be judged irrespective of the procedure that led 
to their appearance. Democratic aggregative procedures are intrinsically flawed because 
they tend to ignore minorities’ needs from consideration. Sen gives the example of 
famines, which would be easily preventable, had people been aware of their occurrence 
and recurrence in many parts of the world. However, the fact that less than 5% of the 
globe’s population is stricken by poverty and has to suffer the hardships of famine means 
that only by public discussion could this problem be solved (Sen 1995, 17). As Anderson 
puts it, “only a vivid awareness of the feasibility of alternatives inspires dissatisfaction with 
normal states of chronic deprivation” (2003, 248).15 Democracy in its aggregative form is 
weakly equipped to respond to people’s needs. This is why Sen has endorsed a deliberative 
conception of democracy, with broader informational bases (Anderson 2003, 248-49). 
Anderson takes Sen’s instrumental arguments for democracy and extends them in order 
to make these compatible with her democratic egalitarian framework. Anderson holds 
that for Sen democracy is a universal value in that it reflects, promotes and is the result 
of practical reason. Anderson provides in this regard the following example: if a society 
15] She links this with the problem of adaptive preferences. Subjective preferences are introduced 
by Sen as a criticism of subjective metrics such as welfarism, which are informationally parsimonious and 
do not take into account the fact that a person may have rationally developed preferences for her deplor-
able state just because she sees no other feasible alternatives. For an interdisciplinary approach to adaptive 
preferences, which combines the capability approach with research from behavioral economics, psychol-
ogy and cognitive dissonance, see Teschl and Comin (2005). See also Peter (2003) for an overview of how 
Sen has attempted to accommodate the problem of adaptive preferences within social choice (and thus to 
enlarge the informational scope of the latter domain).
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afflicted by adaptive preferences problems such as women’s underestimation of their 
own problems would become more responsive to public demands for gender justice, this 
would have a transformative effect on individual women’s desires: “once women no longer 
perceive women’s lesser access to (healthcare) as normal, they may no longer adapt their 
desires to this condition” (Anderson 2003, 251). However, raising women’s problems on 
the public agenda should not be based on identity politics strategies. Anderson emphasizes 
that one of Sen’s concerns is that “resigning to separate, mistrustful identities can be a self-
fulfilling prophecy, entrenching suboptimal parochial self-understandings” (2003, 255).
The incorporation of the concept of positional objectivity in deliberative 
democracy implies a cosmopolitan conception. Sympathy and respect are applicable 
on a global scale. The endpoint of deliberative processes that bring together different 
positional perspectives is a synthesis that can legitimize the decisions. The global trans-
positional outcome is meant to “pay due regard to the interests and perspectives of all”. 
Anderson considers that the political significance of positionality is given by its being 
an epistemological mechanism, not “a matter of parochial solidarity” (Anderson 2003, 
255-58). All in all, it seems that Anderson takes further Sen’s project by emphasizing the 
role of public reasoning in improving disadvantaged individuals’ capability prospects. 
However, one problem that has to be solved is what is the scope of justice. If public 
reasoning takes place within the boundaries of a state, then it fails to account for the 
perspective of those from distant lands. This narrower scope of justice is suggested by 
Anderson’s relational egalitarianism.
In several papers (1999, 2007, 2010b), Anderson has endorsed what she calls 
relational egalitarianism or democratic equality, which represents a reaction to the luck 
egalitarianism of Arneson (1989) or Cohen (1989). According to Anderson, modern 
egalitarian writings have lost their grip with the realworld problems. The politically 
oppressed, race, gender, class inequalities, victims of nationalist genocide, slavery and 
ethnic subordination, all have been more or less ignored by recent egalitarian thought. 
In their attempt to eliminate the effects of brute luck on distributions, luck egalitarians 
have forgotten that the purpose of equality is to end oppression and to ensure that people 
can effectively stand as equals in the community (Anderson 1999, 288). For Anderson, 
luck egalitarians have put the wrong questions, to which they have later given the wrong 
answers. Luck egalitarians have searched for states of affairs whose distributions of goods 
are morally desirable. Relational egalitarians are asking what justice demands of each 
agent, institutional or individual. Justice, for relational egalitarianism, is constrained 
by several elements: principles of justice must be feasible so that agent can realistically 
pursue them (the “ought implies can” maxim), they must be publicly articulable, stable 
and satisfying a Pareto improvement condition, in that no action can be forbidden if it 
can advance some people’s interests to no one else’s loss (Anderson 2010b, 16-18). Luck 
egalitarianism fails to respect the basic principles of any egalitarian theory: that people be 
treated with equal respect and equal concern. It would leave faulty drivers to die on the 
side of the road (the abandonment of negligent victims objection). It would leave people who 
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live in risk-prone areas to incur all costs if they fail to insure, where such an opportunity 
exists (problem of geographical discrimination). It considers that the desire to procreate is an 
expensive taste, and it has no concern for dependent caretakers (problem of vulnerability 
of dependent caretakers). The only way it can take care of such problems is by becoming as 
paternalistic as it gets, telling citizens that they lack the ability to conduct their own lives 
as they should (Anderson 1999, 296-301). 
In relational egalitarianism, equality is a notion characterizing a type of social 
relations between people, instead of being a distribution of non-relational goods. Equality 
entails not a distributive pattern but reflects the idea that all people are equally moral 
agents. Everyone should have the power to develop and exercise moral responsibility, 
to cooperate with others according to some principles of justice, to shape and fulfill a 
conception of their good (Anderson 1999, 312). To this end, goods have to be distributed 
according to principles and processes that express respect for all. Being capable of 
functioning as an equal citizen has to be understood in a very broad sense, from having 
the ability to exercise specific political rights, to participate in the activities of civil society, 
in economy. It is linked to being capable of functioning as a human being, which in turn 
involves effective access to means of subsistence, such as food, shelter, clothing, medical 
care, further backed by the capability to function as a human agent in the proper sense 
of the term. This involves “knowledge of one’s circumstances and options, the ability 
to deliberate about means and ends, psychological conditions of autonomy, freedom of 
thought, of movement, access to education, freedom of occupational choice, the right to 
receive fair value for one’s labor”. Democratic equality’s purpose is not to ensure effective 
access to equal levels of functioning, but to guarantee access to levels of functioning 
sufficient to stand as an equal in society. Anderson considered that democratic equality 
ought to guarantee effective access to a package of capabilities, and that people have to 
function as equals over the course of their entire lives (1999, 317-18).
It is unclear if Anderson’s democratic equality is meant to apply just to Western, 
developed states, or globally. At one point, she mentions that “the point is to identify the 
demands of justice that flow from citizenship in a democratic state  […] Citizens have a 
claim to a capability set sufficient to enable them to function as equals in society” (2010a, 
83). It is obvious, however, that in order for trans-positional objectivity to be achieved, it is 
necessary to surpass the confines of the modern nation-state, towards global democratic 
deliberative processes. Achieving an equal standing in a modern democratic society could 
still mean that the interests of those far from that society would be ignored. If people were 
to be concerned over securing a sufficient level of capabilities throughout a democratic 
state, would they really be concerned to include distant others’ points of view? If people 
were indeed “entitled to access to a level of functioning in virtue of their citizenship” 
(2010a, 95), this would be a narrow conception of justice. Such a narrow scope would 
restrict the capability sets of the distant others. What is needed is to include all viewpoints 
in a deliberative process that is global in scope. Furthermore, it seems peculiar to resort to 
what can be called principle asymmetry – upholding an egalitarian principle of justice at 
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the national level and a sufficientarian conception at the global level. Anderson mentions 
that, on the one hand, all citizens should function as equals, but at the global level, they 
should function as humans (2010a, 88). 
Thus, democratic equality should not be perceived as a distributive view confined 
to a state, but in cosmopolitan terms. Simply put, cosmopolitanism is based on the idea 
that each human being has equal moral worth, and that we have certain responsibilities 
towards all human beings qua human beings (Brock and Brighouse 2005, 1-10)16. This 
is in the spirit of Sen’s open impartiality, who actively endorses public reasoning at the 
global level (2010, 151). Ensuring that democratic equality perceives justice’s scope 
as global would be beneficial for those who nowadays are excluded from deliberation 
processes and whose viewpoints are (objectively) neglected. Fortunately, there is nothing 
in democratic equality that precludes it from dropping this principle asymmetry and 
from embracing a global scope.
I V. A PPLICATIONS 
In the previous section I presented Elizabeth Anderson’s extension of Sen’s 
concepts to feminist deliberative democracy. This is a view according to which positional 
objectivity – and its associated misdeeds such as women’s neglect of their own problems 
pertaining to well-being and health – should be transcended towards trans-positional 
objectivity. Trans-positional objectivity is epistemologically richer because it comprises 
the values, viewpoints and interests of numerous distinct groups, which are all biased by 
their own positional parameters. I argued that although Anderson seems to favor a global 
deliberation, her democratic equality approach can act as a counterweight. Therefore, I 
argued for the extension of the democratic equality approach to justice at the global level. 
I have not provided a particular account, though this should be, based on what has been 
mentioned before a gender-sensitive capability approach. In what follows I will briefly 
present two distinct applications of the Sen-Anderson work on positional objectivity. 
Women, agency and objectivity. Once upon a time in a patriarchy
The concept of agency is one of the fundamental differences between Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s capability approach (Nussbaum 2000, 13). While Sen distinguishes 
between agency and well-being, Nussbaum considers that the capability/functioning 
distinction can accommodate both concepts. Although in some cases this might be 
true, problematic here can be those cases where agency promotion comes at odds with 
well-being promotion.17 These fringe cases are important in the context of the capability 
16] See Dumitru (2017, 234) for some distinctions pertaining to cosmopolitanism and global justice.
17] It seems as if Sen employs the fox’ view, while Nussbaum is more of a hedgehog: “the hedgehog 
[…] has faith that all true values form an interlocking network, that each of our convictions about what is 
good or right plays some role in supporting each of our other convictions in each of these domains of value”, 
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approach because Sen himself has emphasized that one way in which a moral theory can 
be criticized is by the case-implication techniques, which sets out to show that in particular 
circumstances what a normative theory advocates would have counterintuitive results 
(1979, 197). In this subsection I will show how women’s agency can be enhanced. The 
benefits will accrue especially for women from disadvantaged societies, societies which in 
turn might benefit from this enriched objectivity.
Sen distinguishes between the well-being and the agency aspects of a person. Each 
of these can be conceived either in terms of results or of opportunities. Thus, we have four 
logical possibilities: well-being freedom, well-being achievement, agency freedom, agency 
achievement. Agency refers to “what the person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of 
whatever goals or values she regards as important  […] A person’s agency aspect cannot 
be understood without taking note of his or her aims, objectives, allegiances and the 
person’s conception of the good” (Sen 1985, 204). The freedom aspect is emphasized 
more in the concept of agency, because it is directly related to people being responsible 
for their condition. Agency and well-being draw attention to different aspects of a person’s 
life – whereas well-being conveys information regarding a person’s advantage, the agency 
aspect provides an assessment of a person’s ability to do certain things in accordance with 
her conception of the good (Sen 1985, 204-206).
As mentioned before, the two aspects can come in direct conflict. Imagine a rich 
society in which women scored well in terms of well-being freedom and achievement. 
Take the particular case of Anne, who is a middle-class citizen whose conception of the 
good gravitates around helping the poor. In order to show that Nussbaum’s value-unity 
endorsement is flawed, let us further suppose that Anne has reached the threshold in 
regard to all 10 capabilities on Nussbaum’s list (2000). For instance, she developed a social 
network that aims at helping the poor by raising funds (the “Affiliation” capability). She is 
well-regarded in society, she really cares about the poor (Emotions). She has been able 
to form her own conception of the good, and she holds a degree in Political Philosophy 
(Practical Reason). She has Control over her environment, being able to “participate 
effectively in political choices that govern one’s life” (Nussbaum 2000, 80). There is no 
necessity for trades off between capabilities, because she scores so high in all of them. 
However, among those subjects that enter the public debate in which she is involved and 
on which she can vote there is no redistribution proposal. Let us suppose that this happens 
in a parallel universe, where they had no Marx, no Rawls, no Nozick, no Sen, no Nussbaum, 
no Anderson. There is an implicit bias towards a voluntarist ideology, and free market 
processes are supposed to solve all poverty-related problems. The poor, who could argue 
for redistribution, lack the capability Control over one’s environment, because they have 
to struggle with their condition and are not able to engage in political deliberation. Thus, 
the fact that free market processes are fair is positionally objective, since, had the poor 
been in the exact same position as Anne or other rich citizens, they would have had the 
while the fox acknowledges value-conflict (Dworkin 2011, 120; Knight 2015).
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same Weltanschauung. Nonetheless, Anne feels that something is not right, and she would 
deeply want to do something more for the poor. Had the poor been helped to engage in 
public reasoning and to bring their own positional parameters on the agenda, Anne would 
realize that there is in fact something more that she could do in order to help the poor. 
Her agency freedom would go up, and perhaps, if she convinced enough of her friends to 
vote for redistributive programs, her agency achievement would go up too. Nevertheless, her 
well-being freedom and her well-being achievement would go down a little. This example 
shows that there is conflict between agency and well-being. Furthermore, it shows how the 
concept of positional objectivity can be used in connection with the capability approach. 
Imagine now what could happen in today’s patriarchal societies if women’s voices 
had been heard and if they had had a word to say in political decisions. Not only would this 
help those particular women improve their life chances and their well-being freedom and 
achievement, but many others would have a boost in their agency freedom. Of course, this 
process might result in losses of well-being freedom, but as long as everybody’s capabilities 
remain above a certain threshold – that I will not specify here – this is not an argument 
against this reform. In this light, policies to adopt gender quotas can be justified on new 
grounds. Furthermore, they would not reflect a subsumption/abstraction strategy, but 
a pragmatic-epistemic strategy to dealing with positional differences […] concern 
for the representation of disadvantaged groups arises not from a desire to reinforce 
parochial group identities as ends in themselves, but from a desire to construct a more 
global perspective that can pay due regard to everyone’s interests and perspectives 
(Anderson 2003, 253-55). 
Peter (2003, 24) draws attention to another usage of the concept of, in Sen’s 
reconceptualization of social choice. Peter notes that the informational basis provided by 
agency considerations enriches social choice theory. As a consequence of assessing agency 
levels, attention is refocused “from problems of aggregation of unexamined individual 
preferences to participation and inclusion in democratic decision-making”. According to 
Peter (2003, 27), “the challenge for social evaluation of policy alternatives is to register 
and take seriously the interpretations and evaluations of women as situated agents, thus 
identifying the means by which their participation in policy discourses can be enhanced 
and their effectiveness reinforced”. These arguments should not be too surprising. Sen’s 
concept of agency has been considered one of his main contributions for gender-equality 
research programs (Qizilbash 2005).
The race, the deliberation and the trans-positional objectivity
No one bothered to discuss the way in which sexism operates both independently 
of and simultaneously with racism to oppress us. No other group in America has 
so had their identity socialized out of existence as have black women. We are rarely 
recognized as a group separate and distinct from black men, or as a present part of 
the larger group “women” in this culture. When black people are talked about, sexism 
militates against the acknowledgment of the interests of black women; when women 
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are talked about racism militates against a recognition of black women interests. 
When black people are talked about the focus tends to be on black men, and when 
women are talked about the focus tends to be on white women. No where is this more 
evident than in the vast body of feminist literature […]. All too often in our society, 
it is assumed that one can know all there is to know about black people by merely 
hearing the life story and opinions of one black person […]. From the onset of my 
involvement with the women’s movement I was disturbed by the white women’s 
liberationists’ insistence that race and sex were two separate issues […]. My life 
experience had shown me that the two issues were inseparable (hooks 1999, 7-12).
There could be employed several filters through which bell hooks’ words could 
be interpreted. I resort now to one of them, which is Sen’s (2010, 122) urge to validate 
ethical claims by subjecting these to public reasoning processes characterized by 
open impartiality. Sen (2010,123) argued convincingly that in order to achieve such 
open impartiality we have to invoke judgments from “others, outside our focal group”. 
Similarly, bell hooks holds that the woman liberation movement has been characterized 
by a lack of concern for the experiences of the black women. This disregard does not 
come from a malfeasance of white women, but from their positional parameters which 
disallow certain kinds of information from entering the public debate. Sen (2010, 169) 
argues that the fact that our perception of the world is inevitably tied to our position 
in the world affects our understanding and our way of thinking about ethical subjects: 
“in the pursuit of justice, positional illusions can impose serious barriers that have to 
be overcome through broadening the informational basis of evaluations”. Whereas 
Smith has proposed a device such as the impartial spectator, Sen advocates trans-
positionality. We cannot have a view from nowhere, but we can have a view from a 
plurality of somewhere. Sen uses a great deal of the space in The Idea of Justice endorsing 
the idea that “judgments about justice have to take on board the task of accommodating 
different kinds of reasons and evaluative concerns” (2010, 395). Although broadening 
the plurality of justice might lead to incomplete preference orderings, this is not 
necessarily a problem (2010, 398). The richness of human diversity should not be 
hidden but taken advantage of. 
The implications of Sen’s approach to justice can be shown by listing the 
reasons why he considers social choice to be relevant as a “framework for reasoning”: 
“recognition of the inescapable plurality of competing principles, allowing and 
facilitating re-examination, permissibility of partial orderings, diverse interpretations 
and inputs” (Sen 2010, 106-109). These are at odds with approaches that exclude from 
consideration inputs from social groups whose preference orderings might be different 
than those of the majority. Furthermore, there are numerous biases related to one’s 
positional parameters that can be overcome only by switching to a trans-positional 
view.
These are some of the conceptual tools that can be employed to analyze bell 
hooks’ criticisms. Black women’s views have been neglected, since the woman liberation 
movement had incorporated only certain parameters – those inspired by the lives 
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of white women. Albeit discrimination against white women is not to be ignored, it 
cannot be considered the only form of discrimination. The absence of black women 
voices from public debate meant however that their particular experiences had been 
neglected. By advocating the broadening of positional perspectives, the Sen-Anderson 
feminist deliberative democracy can internalize bell hooks’ criticism. The concern for 
including in the public debate the voice of neglected categories is of crucial importance 
for Sen, and this is what provides democratic deliberation with legitimacy (Anderson 
2003, 225). Had black women interests, values and opinions been incorporated 
earlier into the public agenda, trans-positional objectivity would have characterized 
the woman liberation movement. Instead, what happened was that “the efforts of 
white women activists to expand employment opportunities for women were focused 
exclusively on improving the lot of white women workers, who did not identify with 
black women workers” (hooks 1999, 132). Although bell hooks notes that there had 
also been a persistent rivalry between white women and black women for access to 
the job market, this does not mean that a conciliatory relationship would have solved 
anything. No matter how good their intentions, white women could not have known 
the positional specificities of black women experiences. In this subsection I have 
argued for interpreting this criticism of feminism by resorting to Sen’s conceptual 
apparatus. This puts in a new light radical feminists’ criticism of “white woman 
feminism” and shows that it is justified both ethically and epistemologically. Although 
the white women liberation movement had made objective assessments of the state of 
affairs, these evaluations had been hopelessly positionally objective, biased by their 
own positional parameters.
V. CONCLUSIONS
I advocated in this paper a version of gender-sensitive capability approach which 
accounts for positional objectivity. I presented the capability approach, insisting on 
Sen’s endorsement for open impartiality and trans-positional objectivity. I followed Sen 
and Anderson in showing what public reason has to gain from the inclusion of women 
problems on the agenda. I held that the capability approach can contribute to women’s 
gaining equal standing in society. On the other hand, I have argued for a version of 
cosmopolitan democratic equality, which satisfies the criterion of open impartiality 
and goes beyond the confines of a narrow set of denizens of the globe. I have not 
advanced a specific proposal in this regard, which is a task that I leave for another paper. 
However, on a more constructive note, I have shown how we can use Sen’s research on 
positional objectivity, agency and social choice in order to accommodate some radical 
feminist criticisms of mainstream women’s movements, specifically regarding bell 
hooks’ diatribe against the lack of concern for the black women’s particular situation. 
I reconceptualized bell hook’s arguments in Sen’s terms, since her criticisms can be 
considered to refer to the informational parsimony of mainstream feminist theories. 
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The stake of the paper, however, is not limited to the applications mentioned above. 
The concept of positional objectivity can be employed in regard to other issues as well, 
bridging together feminist theories, political philosophy and social choice.18
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